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authors  conclude  that  the  majority  of 
reforms  were  implemented  at  a  pace 
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lasts much longer than was predicted on the 
eve of the reform process: initial conditions 
strongly and significantly affect the speed of 
transition throughout the entire observed 
period  (1989-2007).  They  also  affect  the 
performance of a country: in the first years 
the transition progress may affect growth 
in  a  positive  way,  but  later  it  becomes 
insignificant.  This  can  explain  some 
growth  peculiarities  previously  remarked 
when  transition  countries  were  analysed 
by  means  of  long-run  growth  models. 
Using Barro and Levine-Renelt models the 
authors show that despite somewhat better 
results for the second decade of transition 
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1. INTRODUCTION
From the very beginning of the transition process there existed the puzzling 
question of how and when transition economies may be regarded suitable to 
join the world of the developed market economies. For the European transition 
economies the question was particularly interesting since the majority of them were 
counting on accession to the European Union. The question was also important 
for the non-European economies since their aim was to catch up with the world’s 
developed economies in order to perform at a higher level and to provide their 
populations with a higher and desired standard of living. 
The architects of transition were persuasive and confident that the process would 
not take much time, while the results would be satisfactory on a broad scale and in 
the relatively short run. They had introduced a certain set of measures and policies 
that if carried out accurately would lead those economies into the system of good 
and effective performance in a relatively short period. Recalling these opinions we 
have to point out the seminal analytical papers on the issue, like the two presented 
by de Melo et al. (1996, 1997), which conclude that countries which carry out 
their reforms faster perform better in terms of their GDP per capita level, and that 
proper policies can overpass some deficiencies in the starting positions of those 
countries, particularly if there is a strong commitment regarding new policies and 
if there is a decisive policy to implement them persistently (which in turn and 
unsurprisingly happens just among those countries which are faster in reform 
promotion). These papers together with some other findings (Sachs, 1996) seemed 
to provide important arguments in favour of the idea that the speed of transition 
matters and that the reforms should be implemented as fast as possible, to be 
rewarded by higher growth rates and faster recovery from transition recession.
However, further studies showed that the issue of velocity in carrying out reforms 
is not that straightforward. A number of authors, including some who have agreed 
with de Melo1 and others who expressed some doubts about the conclusions 
presented2,  have  found  that  the  speed  of  transition  and  the  quality  of  new 
institutions cannot be separated from the inherited conditions. Moreover speed 
of reforms, transition progress and performance of a transition economy appear 
to be largely dependent on initial conditions in the country in question, as well 
as on institution building. This finding is not a new idea: it is commonly known 
1  Like: Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Heybey and Murrell (1999), Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000) 
2  Like: Popov (2000), Stiglitz (2001), Ellerman (2003); an author of this paper also took part see: 
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that on a spoiled piece of land the harvest will not be abundant – unless a certain 
amount of investment is spent on cultivation. 
The debate on whether the speed of the transition progress – depending on the 
willingness of policy makers to follow projected policies – is crucial for economic 
performance, or whether the speed of reforms should be seen as an endogenous 
variable depending on inherited, pre-reform initial conditions, has attracted the 
attention of the authors of this paper. Also provoking were some analytical results 
that have been pointing out how transition economies perform in an unexpected 
way concerning traditional growth models. In this paper we try to examine some 
of these findings and to examine the questions of what determines the transition 
progress, what the transition progress could add to the growth of certain transition 
economies, and how transition economies behave regarding established growth 
models. The last question is of particular interest as it establishes the field where it 
should be possible to find answers to transition countries’ catch-up problems. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Firstly, we shall try to examine the current state 
of art regarding the transition progress. The analysis will show why transition is 
not as easy and speedy process as was predicted on the eve of transition. We shall 
also examine what forces command the process and what is the influence of the 
initial conditions, or to what extent we may understand the transition process 
as an endogenous phenomenon. In these two sections we shall rely mainly on 
our previous paper (Cerovic & Nojokovic, 2008) in order to make our further 
arguments clear. Secondly, we shall investigate what role the speed and/or progress 
of reforms play concerning economic growth and output level of an economy 
in transition and how much (and for how long) it can affect the growth of a 
transition country. Finally, we shall examine how transition economies behave 
in comparison with the standard long-term models of growth, if there are some 
specific features and what consequences these results might have on the catching-
up process of those economies. 
2. MEASURING TRANSITION PROGRESS
There are several well developed criteria for measuring transition progress – 
starting from World Bank’s Composite Liberalisation Index to the European Bank’s 
(EBRD) nine indicators, which have become particularly popular in past years 
thanks to their systematic publication and presentation. Referring to the latter 
ones we can observe that the range of EBRD indicators goes from 1 for no change 
to 4+ (or 4.33) for ‘as if’ a developed market economy. Thus, the point that has 10
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to be passed by a transition economy in terms of a sum of all the nine indicators3 
actually ranges from 9 to 38.97 (4.33 x 9, or 39). In other words, a country on its 
transition route has to earn some 29.97 (or 30) points, as measured in compliance 
with the EBRD methodology4. Starting from this conclusion and in accordance 
with the EBRD assessments for all transition countries in 2007 (EBRD 2007), 
in our previous paper (Cerovic & Nojkovic, 2008) we defined another measure 
that shows how far transition economies are from the aimed market model after 
around 18 years of transition. We calculated the position of each economy on the 
transition path in terms of percentage points, with 0% representing their starting 
position (no reforms) and 100% depicting a fully developed market economy5. 
The obtained estimates are shown in the following table (Table 1):
Table 1.   Transition Progress in % 
(authors’ calculation based on the EBRD indicators, 2007)
Country EBRD
Progress 
(%)
Country EBRD
Progress 
(%)
Albania 26.66 58.92 Macedonia, FYR 28.32 64.46
Armenia 27.99 63.36 Moldova 26.66 58.93
Azerbaijan 23.67 48.95 Mongolia 26.99 60.03
Belarus 16.66 25.56 Montenegro 25.01 53.42
Bosnia and Herzegovina 24.34 51.18 Poland 33.99 83.38
Bulgaria 31.34 74.54 Romania 30.67 72.31
Croatia 31.66 75.61 Russia 27.33 61.16
Czech Republic 34.32 84.48 Serbia  24.67 52.29 
Estonia 35.33 87.85 Slovak Republic 33.66 82.28
Georgia 27.66 62.26 Slovenia 30.33 71.17
Hungary 35.33 87.85 Tajikistan 21.33 41.14
Kazakhstan 27.01 60.09 Turkmenistan 11.67 8.91
Kyrgyz Republic 26.33 57.82 Ukraine 27.00 60.06
Latvia 32.66 78.95 Uzbekistan 19.35 34.53
Lithuania 33.32 81.15
Source: EBRD 2008
3  The nine EBRD indicators are: small scale privatisation, large scale privatisation, enterprise 
reform  (governance  and  restructuring),  price  liberalisation,  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets 
and non-bank financial institutions and infrastructure reform.
4  We took this new and convincing method of calculation from Nuti (2008). It should be 
mentioned that percentages in calculating transition progress have been used previously by 
Gabrisch and Hoelscher (2006: 9) but it seems that in their calculations they did not subtract 
the initial nine points.
5  The calculus is very simple: we divide the sum of the EBRD indicators (minus nine) for each 
country by 29.97, multiplying the result by 100 to get percentage points.Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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It can easily be seen that, according to the EBRD methodology, only eight countries 
(28% of the 29 observed) have accomplished reforms of 75% or more of the 
intended developed market economy structure. Among them only two countries 
are close to the 90% threshold (Estonia and Hungary) and one of them has just 
overstepped the 75% line (Croatia). Thirteen countries are in the range 55%-75% 
in accomplishing reforms, ten of which are in the range 55%-65%. There are eight 
countries below 55%6. 
However, the most important result is that the figures presented portray the 
outcome of the transition process and its modest results nearly two decades after 
recommended transition policies were declared. At that time we were told that the 
time horizon for full reform was close (‘jump over a chasm in one leap’) including 
some apparently cautious durability forecasts of not more than approximately ten 
years.7 After 18 years (some leap which lasts that long!) it appears that the transition 
process is much more demanding, that it depends on many different and not yet 
fully recognised factors, and definitely is not merely a matter of strong or weak 
willingness and commitment among policy makers in transition countries. 
It is obvious that expectations about the speed of reforms have not been confirmed 
and it is most plausible that some other forces – neglected at the beginning of 
transition – play an important role. This brings us again to the issue of endogeneity 
of the transition progress and to the role of initial conditions, inherited level of 
development, and institutional capacity in conducting reforms. 
3. TRANSITION PROGRESS AS AN ENDOGENOUS vARIABlE
The endogenous character of the transition progress basically refers to inherited 
initial conditions within a country. There are several groups of these pre-transition 
conditions  among  which  two  groups  dominate:  (a)  level  of  development  in 
terms  of  the  GDP  per  capita  together  with  macroeconomic  conditions,  or 
rather distortions, and (b) the inherited level of institutional capacity, including 
experience in governance of a market oriented economy or at least in conducting 
6  The relative progress of the countries is not that transparent if we calculate it directly from 
the EBRD indicators since the EBRD indicators present a more optimistic picture of reform 
success: a country with, say, 20 EBRD points, looks as if it has already passed the half way 
point to a market economy, whereas in reality it has passed a bit more than a third of that 
route (this difference is due to the fact that the EBRD indicators donate nine points before any 
change is taken).
7  Fischer and Gelb (1991); one may also recall Dornbusch’s allegoric ‘seven days’ (1991).12
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some deeper reforms within the preceding economic system. Since the data are 
usually lacking it is relatively difficult to fully assess initial conditions although 
some attempts have been made8. 
Having this in mind, we have examined the impact of the following variables on 
transition progress (TPROG, in terms of percentage points as explained above): 
(i) value (in US$) of the GDP per capita in 1989 expressed by purchasing power 
parity (GDP1989), (ii) dummy variable stating whether a country had deeper 
market oriented reforms during communism or not (MREF), (iii) number of 
years of communist rule in an economy (INST1), (iv) black market premium in 
exchange rate compared with the official one in 1990, that is on the eve of transition 
(INST5), which is used as a proxy for various macroeconomic distortions.9 
In the paper we refer to (Cerovic & Nojkovic, 2008), we have tested a set of 
regression equations in order to estimate for how long and how much initial 
conditions influence reforms. We tested several models for the years 1998, 2001, 
2004 and 200710. In all the models the results obtained were similar. Here we shall 
reproduce the results for 2004 and 2007 only11. These results for 23 transition 
economies are presented in Table 2.12 
8  As to initial conditions, already in seminal papers of de Melo et al. one can find a set of 
indicators  for  macroeconomic  inherited  surroundings  and  even  for  some  institutional 
variables. Later there were attempts in collecting additional data (e.g. Campos, 1999; Moers, 
1999; Fischer and Sahay, 2004; Roland, 2007; etc).
9  Due to a chronic lack of data for transition economies we used for variables (i), (iii) and (iv) 
the results published in de Melo et al. (1997) and for variable (ii) we put a dummy stating that 
former Yugoslav countries, Hungary and Poland had some experience with market oriented 
reforms (represented by the value 1 and 0 for the others).
10  We have estimated a set of additional equations for the same period that includes some other 
variables describing various initial conditions as publicised in both papers of de Melo et al. 
In doing so we have discovered that many of them influence transition progress for a long 
period. However, we use the models from Table 2 since the variables used in those equations 
better represent something of the institutional heritage than the others.
11  Other results have been presented in our paper already quoted (Cerovic & Nojkovic, 2008) 
12  We could not find all necessary data for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan that appear in Table 1.Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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Table 2. Independent variable: TPROG (2004, 2007)
Variable
TPROG 2004 TPROG 2007
Equ. 1 Equ.2 Equ. 3 Equ. 1 Equ. 2 Equ. 3
Constant 42.6856 93.6131 56.2956 46.3134 98.5921 59.546
(5.554)*** (7.979)*** (7.754)*** (7.973)*** (8.061)*** (7.804)***
GDP1989 0.0034 0.0028 0.0034 0.0032 0.0026 0.0033
(2.429)** (3.111)*** (2.833)*** (2.286)** (2.600)*** (2.539)**
MREF 11.8103 11.1888
(2.140)** (1.971)*
INST1 -0.8068 -0.8298
(-4.382)*** (-4.329)***
INST5 -0.0973 -0.0948
(-3.169)*** (-2.917)***
R 2 (%) 32 65.5 46.4 28.4 64.2 42.1
Adj. R 2 (%) 25.2 62.1 41 21.2 60.6 36.3
D W 
statistics
1.92 1.77 1.76 1.93 1.85 1.81
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
Note: t-statistics for coefficient estimates in parentheses;***denotes statistically significant at 1% level; 
** denotes statistically significant at 5% level; * denotes statistically significant at 10% level.
The  most  impressive  result  in  the  table  presented  is  that  initial  conditions 
permanently and significantly influence transition progress over the entire analysed 
period. Moreover, the explanatory power of the models in terms of adjusted R2 
does not necessarily diminish over time13. For instance, equation 2 with the initial 
GDP and INST1 suggests that the impact of initial conditions increases over time 
until the period beyond 2004. This is not surprising: some of the countries that 
were under a planned economy longer, like the countries from the former USSR, 
had no notable experience of the market economy under either communist rule 
or in their preceding history (excluding to some extent Baltic countries). 
According to the results obtained we may conclude that the hypothesis of the impact 
of initial conditions on the transition progress of a country has been confirmed and 
that the influence of economic and institutional heritage lasts much longer than 
predicted at the beginning of transition and in the first transition advancement 
analyses. Therefore we shall explore the real achievements in transition reforms 
13  This differs from the findings of de Melo et al. 1996, 1997 who claimed that proper policies 
and the willingness and commitment of policymakers to swiftly implement them should 
overpass some deficiencies in the starting positions of transition countries14
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implementation among countries in transition and whether they could advance 
better. 
4. TRANSITION PROGRESS AND GROWTH 
In this section we shall deal with our principal question: what relationship between 
transition and growth might be expected? The architects of the transition process 
have presented a set of measures and policies stating that if these policies were 
carried out accurately they should lead economies in transition into a system of 
effective performance in a relatively short period. As mentioned in the introductory 
notes, there are a number of papers arguing a firm relationship of proper transition 
policies and their fast implementation with GDP per capita levels achieved during 
transition. However, a good number of contributors on the issue drew attention 
to the role of inherited conditions and their effect on transition progress. This 
should necessarily influence our further study: if the speed of reforms depends 
on inherited conditions and is endogenous there are fewer possibilities for policy 
makers to choose the speed of reforms on their own. Moreover, if the speed of 
reforms matters regarding growth and is determined to a considerable extent by 
initial conditions then the growth itself should depend on initial conditions.
Although in the previous section we have confirmed the arguments concerning 
inherited conditions and their influence on transition advancement, we shall 
firstly  estimate  an  almost  conventional  model  for  transition  economies  that 
takes GDP level achieved as being dependant on initial conditions and reform 
progress. We put GDP per capita for the years 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 to be 
the dependent variable whereas independent variables are: (a) GDP per capita 
from 1989 (GDP1989), (b) transition progress (TPROG) measured by percentage 
points (as in Table 1) squared (squared in order to capture U shaped transition 
growth), (c) a dummy– whether a country had deeper market oriented reforms 
or not (MREF, as explained in footnote 9) and (d) average rate of inflation from 
1994 (INF average; EBRD 2008 data) to avoid the first and unstable years of the 
transition process. Taking a set of 25 transition economies with available data we 
have obtained the following results14:
14  We put back Tajikistan and Turkmenistan into the observed set since their necessary data 
were available.Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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Table 3. Dependent variable: GDP per capita in different years
Note: t-statistics for coefficient estimates in parentheses;  *** denotes statistically significant at 1% 
level; ** denotes statistically significant at 5% level; * denotes statistically significant at 10% level. 
What information can we derive from the analysis presented? First, there is an 
interesting piece of evidence: GDP 1989, that is, the initial per capita income of a 
country, has a positive sign, suggesting that more developed countries performed 
better in terms of their GDP per capita levels. This relationship is statistically 
significant at a high level. The finding could be in contrast with accustomed 
growth models which suggest the poorer countries should grow faster and in 
doing so can catch up with developed economies. In the sections that follow we 
shall analyse whether this finding indicates such an unexpected outcome, albeit 
already remarked in the literature (see: Campos, 2001). 
One can also remark that lower inflation and/or stable macroeconomic environment 
support better economic performance, which is not surprising15. It is not surprising 
either that the countries that have undergone certain reforms while being under 
the framework of a “socialist economy” have been more successful regarding their 
GDP per capita levels. Finally, the variable that stays for transition progress is also 
positively related to performance as measured by the GDP per capita although its 
significance varies over time. However, this finding could be another intriguing point 
of the analysis: we have already remarked how initial conditions affect transition 
progress – more developed transition economies have higher potential for faster 
reforms. But if faster reforms push up performance and if more developed transition 
economies perform better under transition a proposition could be established that 
15  See, for example: Radulescu and Barrlow (2002)16
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only these more developed economies can successfully pass the transition process 
and advance faster or at least at lower costs in terms of GDP losses. 
In this respect we can report another interesting result. When attempting to 
estimate a somewhat different specification where instead of the variable MREF 
we used a variable that brings up the number of years that an economy had spent 
under  a  previous  (socialist/communist)  economic  system  (INST1)16  we  have 
found some important specificities. The effect of INST1 on GDP per capita is 
(expectedly) negative and significant, while the variable TPROG*TPROG appear 
to be positive with GDP per capita level, but insignificant! This is due to the 
multicollinearity problem since we have included in the model two variables – 
TPROG*TPROG and INST1 – that are quite strongly correlated17. In other words, 
the relationship between explanatory variables is stronger than the relationship 
between TPROG*TPROG and GDP per capita. However, this econometric aspect 
brings us again to the issue of initial conditions, suggesting that initial conditions 
dominate in explaining both phenomena – GDP level and transition progress. 
However, the results presented in Table 3 cannot tell us directly what the effects 
on growth were during transition: we have only learned that countries with higher 
initial GDP-s per capita will remain with higher GDP-s per capita during and/or after 
transition process. On the other hand transition economies (due to restructuring or 
disorganisation and/or other reasons) have to pass a specific type of recession, called 
transition recession, which makes their GDP curve acquire a U shaped form. From 
the above models we cannot directly obtain evidence about this effect and its length.
For that reason, we may use GDP indices during transition – not just GDP per 
capita values – to find out how much they correspond to the transition progress of 
each country. This might explain to what extent transition progress could possibly 
add to emerging faster from the expected recession. It is also important to identify 
how much initial GDP per capita correlates with the transition progress itself or 
how much an initial level of development alone can help in speeding up transition 
reforms within a country. In Table 4 we present correlation coefficients for the 
first pair – GDP indices (base year is 1989; EBRD, 2008a data for the same 25 
transition economies as in Table 3) in selected points of time (1998, 2001, 2004 
and 2007) and transition progress:
16  This variable was firstly employed by de Melo et al. (1996). 
17  For example, the correlation coefficient between these two variables for 2007 data is r = -0.77, 
while the coefficient of determination from the auxiliary regression of TPROG*TPROG on 
all other explanatory variables in the equation is also substantially high, R2 = 0.73. For this 
reason, it is clear that the problem of multicollinearity appears and is serious in this model. Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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Table 4.   Correlation between GDP indices (1989=100) and TPROG  
in different years
We found that only in (or until) the year 1998 was there a certain and significant 
(1%) positive correlation between transition progress and achieved GDP among 
25 analysed transition economies. However, in later years this relationship became 
insignificant and began to disappear. Moreover, in the last year of our analysis 
(2007) an unexpected result emerged – transition progress remained insignificant 
when related to GDP indices but the sign of the coefficient is negative, or in other 
words, if it was significant more transition reforms would prevent faster growth 
and/or recovery from transition recession. 
However, this undoubtedly peculiar result from the standpoint of those advocating 
speedy  reforms  as  a  course  to  faster  and  more  efficient  growth  is  not  that 
surprising. Some countries, as explained above, did not have sufficient capacity 
for recommended reforms and their fast implementation, due to their inherited 
development level. This is very evident from the following correlation coefficients 
between initial GDP per capita values and transition progress: 
Table 5. Correlation between GDPpc in 1989 and TPROG in different years
Contrary to the previous table here we find a pretty firm and significant correlation 
between the two variables, with almost equal value of the coefficients across the 
entire period. These results, in a somewhat simpler manner than before, highlight 
the impact that initial level of development has on the transition advancement of 
an economy18. 
18  This impact is not hard to explain – the higher the income, the better the human and 
sometimes social capital, the necessary institutions can be better and faster established or 
improved, the logic of the new system can be understood on a broader scale etc. and the 
reforms can be implemented in a smoother way and at lower cost. 18
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Again, the two conclusions are very much opposed to the initial ideas. According 
to de Melo et al. (1996, 1997) as well as some other contributions (Sachs, 1996; 
Fischer  et  al.  1996),  the  speed  of  reforms  should  improve  performance  and 
growth while the impact of initial conditions diminishes over time. According to 
our results this statement was incorrect; moreover, the effects are quite different. 
Although the transition progress can add something to growth in the first years 
of transition later its impact becomes irrelevant, whereas initial and inherited 
conditions constrain reforms as well as the level of output over all of the observed 
period. 
In our view, even the effects of transition progress on growth in the first years 
of transition (which we have identified for 1998)19 could be understood in an 
alternative and more appropriate way. Basically, the transition from the early to late 
nineties was characterised by the fact that more developed countries i.e. countries 
with better potential for reforms, advanced faster in terms of GDP. This could be 
easily explained by taking into consideration a simple truth: in these economies 
all other factors of economic growth were better; higher income induced higher 
savings, human capital was of better quality, institutional environment and general 
attitude toward the new system was positive, easing in that way the reforms, and, in 
turn, attracting investors (while investments could be more effective than in other 
transition economies) etc. Looking backwards it seems that this was exactly what 
happened, particularly in Central Europe: Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic are among those initially more developed countries, 
whose transition recession was shorter and performance better, while they had 
some market experience either through their own earlier reforms or because they 
had spent less time under a central planning regime20. 
5.   TRANSITION PROGRESS AND GROWTH:  
POSSIBIlITIES AND ACHIEvEMENTS
Following the results of the analysis presented we may conclude that the transition 
process  seems  to  provoke  an  unexpected  and  somewhat  peculiar  pattern  of 
growth: although proposed as a general policy for enhancing efficiency and better 
performance it has favoured primarily the more developed countries. However, 
19  The impact of transition reforms on growth in the first phase (first several years) of transition 
followed by the diminishing influence in further phases/years have been remarked in a 
number of papers; see e.g. Fidrmuc (2003); Falcetti et al. (2005). 
20  Nevertheless, even these countries have passed a longer and deeper recession than the one 
predicted by transition policy advisors (see: Tridico, 2006: 15-16). Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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even many of these countries suffered from transition recession, albeit somewhat 
shorter and shallower. Some twenty years after transition began seems to be a 
proper time to look over the results achieved. In the further analysis we shall 
compare the achieved values of EBRD indicators recalculated into percentage 
points (as if in Table 1) and the fitted percentage of accomplished reforms as it 
results from the model presented in Table 2 of this paper. 
In the following table we put together the figures that represent real achievements 
of transition economies in reforms conducted (percentage points, according to 
EBRD, 2007 for 23 countries from Table 2) together with the fitted values of those 
indicators (percentage points calculated according to the models from Table 3). 
In the last column we add the real GDP indices for 2006 (according to EBRD, 
2007: 35). This survey can help in assessing whether a country, in reforming its 
economic structure, did as much as it could (since transition progress appeared 
to be an endogenous variable) and what its economic performance was compared 
with its achievements in conducting reforms. 
Table 6.   Transition progress in 2007 - real and fitted values (in %) and  
GDP index 200621
  Real values Equation 1: 
Fitted values
Equation 
2: Fitted 
values
Equation 
3: Fitted 
values
GDP 
index
1989=100
Albania 58.92 50.85 63.29 60.01 143
Armenia 63.36 64.23 54.29 60.30 126
Azerbaijan 48.95 61.28 52.71 57.32 136
Belarus 25.56 69.03 57.37 65.14 135
Bulgaria 74.54 62.52 76.12 67.17 101
Croatia 75.61 77.50 76.72 79.47 105
Czech R. 84.48 74.18 86.46 85.92 130
Estonia 87.85 75.15 79.78 71.32 145
Georgia 62.26 64.43 55.27 60.49 53
Hungary 87.85 79.57 81.73 81.38 134
Kazakhstan 60.09 62.94 53.23 58.99 125
Kyrgyz R. 57.82 56.62 48.08 52.61 87
Latvia 78.95 74.15 78.97 70.31 113
Lithuania 81.15 67.15 73.26 63.24 108
Macedonia FYR 64.46 68.50 68.56 70.39 91
21  The table was first published in our previously mentioned paper (Cerovic & Nojkovic, 2008).20
Economic Annals, Volume LIV, No. 183 / October – December 2009.
Moldova 58.93 61.45 68.61 57.50 49
Poland 83.38 74.19 78.18 73.76 158
Romania 72.31 57.56 72.91 63.99 113
Russia 61.16 71.33 57.58 67.46 93
Slovak R. 82.28 70.94 83.82 82.65 137
Slovenia 71.17 87.31 84.73 89.38 141
Ukraine 60.06 64.72 52.19 60.79 63
Uzbekistan 34.53 55.19 46.92 51.17 137
Looking at the table we can easily see that a large majority of the countries behave 
in accordance with expected i.e. fitted values while only a few countries distinctly 
deviate  from  their  fitted  route.  Thus,  for  example,  the  correlation  coefficient 
between real and fitted values for Equation 2 (which has the highest coefficient of 
determination among the equations presented in Table 2) is high and significant 
or precisely: r = 0.80133 (p = 0.0000). This result confirms that in general countries 
in transition have been implementing reforms at a pace that would have been 
expected if initial conditions had been taken into account at the beginning of 
transition reforms. It also suggests that rushing reforms is not helpful since the 
speed of reforms depends on inherited initial constraints and cannot avoid their 
impact. 
Analysing the data presented one can see that there are only two countries that are 
considerably far off their fitted values – Belarus and Uzbekistan. Although Belarus 
has never claimed to be following the common transition path, it is remarkable that 
both countries, despite their poorly assessed transition progress, achieved a GDP 
index which is comparable or even higher than in some countries usually quoted 
as champions of transition reforms, such as Hungary22. Although we cannot claim 
that these two countries have chosen the best available ways of development we 
may conclude that, for the time being at least, they have found a certain trade-off 
between GDP growth and a (non-pursued) transition agenda23.
The second remarkable point that appears in the data in Table 6 is that some 
countries seem to perform better in their transition progress than their fitted values 
22  Another  example  of  this  kind  is  Turkmenistan,  which  is  not  in  our  sample  due  to  an 
unrecoverable lack of data, with the GDP per capita index at the level of 177 – the highest of 
all countries surveyed in the EBRD reports (see: EBRD, 2007). 
23  It would be wise to point out here that we do not see these countries as examples to be followed: 
it is not known what backs their performance and whether their performance is sustainable. 
We simply confront the facts and data without further conclusions and comments. Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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would suggest. According to the data presented there are countries that almost 
systematically show a noticeably higher transition progress than the calculated 
(fitted) one, e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, with Poland in first place. These 
countries have high EBRD assessments for achievements in transition; these high 
values of EBRD indicators go together with high GDP indices in Poland, Estonia 
and Hungary24, which, however, is true to a much lesser extent for Lithuania. 
On the other hand there are countries – like Slovenia known for its gradual and 
partially original approach to transition policies – that are systematically below 
the fitted values but nevertheless very convincing by the GDP index achieved. 
What might be the reason for this divergence?
Traditionally and following de Melo et al. one might assert that the policy set up 
in a country could be an explanation for some of these discrepancies. If the actual 
transition progress of a country is above the corresponding fitted value, we may 
think of this policy as a particularly good one, and the contrary if the result of a 
country stays below the related fitted value. However, we may also assume that 
the EBRD assessments – which stay behind our percentage figures – have possibly 
been overestimated in some cases and for the countries that are above their fitted 
values, and underestimated in the case of countries that stay below their fitted 
values for transition progress. Moreover, we can question whether the value of the 
EBRD indicators is particularly high for those countries that follow recommended 
transition policies more strictly, and too low for those that exhibit a certain degree 
of originality – but this could be left for another discussion.
From another perspective we may conclude that according to the figures presented 
– and as already stated – the transition process is still in progress and is not close 
to its end. Although at the beginning there was the idea of a close horizon that 
would designate the accomplishment of reforms, we have seen that after almost 
two decades many countries remain very much behind the projected goal. The 
point is that this misjudged period has direct consequences on performance: if 
the transition process were fast the corresponding transition recession and the 
corresponding U shaped GDP growth curve should be short and shallow. Since 
this is not true the transition recession including the subsequent recovery might 
last much longer and induce considerably higher costs than expected.
24  Ironically enough, two countries from this group – Estonia and Hungary – have recently 
experienced significant trouble: Estonia was in recession through 2008 with double digit 
inflation and with an external debt of around 115% of the GDP (v. Eesti Pank, 2008) and 
Hungary was badly stricken by the recent crisis and has been subject to a $25 billion rescue 
package delivered by the IMF, EU and World Bank, and is still facing serious problems.22
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Indeed, looking at the countries’ performance we can easily see that only ten 
countries in 2007, that is, after 18 years of transition efforts, have passed the 
limit of 130 in their GDP indices (base year: 1989), or have a real GDP growth 
of 30% or more over the observed period. Surprisingly enough, among these 
countries there are only three that have been assessed as frontrunners in the 
transition progress (Poland, Estonia and Hungary) and are above the fitted values 
for transition progress. The other three countries (Albania, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) are – more or less – at their fitted figures. The remaining four countries 
are those that are lagging behind the fitted values but are not of the same kind – 
here we find Slovenia, an EU member and among the most successful transition 
economies according to the GDP index, although with a lower assessment for 
transition progress in comparison with the fitted values, but also the three former 
USSR republics – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Uzbekistan, which are on a low level 
of transition progress as well as below their fitted values for reform achievements 
(the  reason  for  which  differs  across  these  countries).  All  the  other  countries 
are below the 130 line and among them six are still under the 100 level or, after 
18 years, still under impact of transition recession25. Among those remaining 
countries there are only two that could be assessed as lagging behind their fitted 
transition progress and whose poor performance could be ascribed to ineffective 
government policies26. 
According to the outcome presented it would be challenging to analyse the effects 
of the recent and/or ongoing crisis within transition economies. However, it seems 
that the remedies for the new blow that is currently hitting transition economies 
are considerably different as compared to those applied during the transition 
period in overcoming transition recession27. 
25  It should be remarked that due to lack of data we did not present the figures for all transition 
economies, but if we had the picture would be even more disturbing. Thus for example, 
the western Balkans countries still exhibit poor performance although the reason might 
sometimes differ from those discussed in our paper (on data for these countries see, e.g. 
Bartlett (2009: 24-28). 
26  Among this group of countries we find Russia, a country that has somewhat deteriorated 
according  to  the  EBRD  indicators  for  transition  progress  after  the  year  2000,  but  was 
simultaneously performing better in terms of GDP growth. 
27  In this respect we agree with Nuti (2009: 20) who points out that policies applied in the 
current crisis like “monetary easing and low interest rates, fiscal subsidies and expansion, 
large scale state intervention” are all “diametrically opposite to the draconian hyper-liberal 
policies that contributed so much to aggravate the transition recession and the other costs of 
transition in the 1990s”. Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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6. TRANSITION AND GROWTH PECUlIARITIES IN THE lONG RUN
Summarising our previous results we have concluded that in the first period of 
transition there appears a certain relationship between transition progress and 
growth: transition progress seems to stimulate growth but is itself an endogenous 
variable that depends on initial conditions including the achieved level of GDP 
in the pre-transition period. Moreover, it was shown that the initial GDP level 
dominates in this relationship, which means that initial GDP is more correlated 
with transition progress than transition progress can be seen as a specific factor 
of growth.
This can additionally explain why transition economies exhibit peculiar behaviour 
when confronted with traditional long run growth models: the more developed 
economies perform better and grow faster. As mentioned above this peculiar 
outcome (together with some others that will be commented on below) has been 
presented by Campos (2001), but only for the first decade of transition. Since we 
have demonstrated that the transition process is still ongoing and is not approaching 
its end in most of the countries – at least not in the way it was designed – it is 
important to analyse whether transition economies show observed peculiarities 
in the current phase: that is, at the end of the second decade of transition. 
Following Campos, we have explored two specifications: the one presented by 
Barro (1991) and the one put forward by Levin and Renelt (1992). The Barro 
model suggests that real GDP growth is a function of the initial level of per capita 
income, the level of human capital (measured by gross primary and secondary 
school enrolment rate) and the share of government consumption in GDP. In this 
specification initial income and government consumption are expected to have a 
negative effect on growth while human capital should have a positive impact. The 
Levin and Renelt specification suggests that initial level of per capita income, rate 
of population growth, level of human capital, and share of investments in GDP are 
key determinants of growth of an economy. Specifically, investments and human 
capital are expected to be positively related to growth, while initial income and 
population growth are expected to be negatively related to growth. 
When Campos (2001) used Barro and Levine-Renelt models to examine the 
growth pattern in 24 transition economies covering the period from 1989 to 1998 
he got several surprising results. Among the variables that have been identified as 
the long-run determinants of growth, only a few were statistically significant in the 
sample of transition economies. The signs for initial income per capita, population 
growth, government consumption and secondary education were opposite to 24
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what one might expect, and not statistically significant. It was only the coefficient 
on basic education that showed an expected positive sign and was statistically 
significant. The coefficient on investments became statistically significant at the 
10% level only when the baseline model was augmented by including the CIS 
dummy variable for the countries from the former USSR, which had a negative 
sign – as expected – and was statistically significant. Compared with the result 
obtained by traditional growth accounting, it is found that the Levine-Renelt and 
Barro approach performs poorly in a transition context. According to Campos 
(2001), econometric and data problems seem much less severe than the structural 
difference remaining after almost a decade of transition (i.e. when he presented 
his paper). 
Concerned by these findings we have re-estimated the two specifications, using 
cross-sectional data of 25 transition economies and covering the whole period 
of transition – from 1989 to 2007, as well as the second transition decade – from 
1999 to 2007. In Table 7 we demonstrate estimation results obtained together 
with the results found by Campos (2001) both for transition and non-transition 
economies.
Table 7.   Barro and Levine-Renelt specifications – estimation results:  
Dependent variable: average annual GDP growth rate Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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Note: t-statistics for coefficient estimates in parentheses;  *** denotes statistically significant at 1% 
level, ** denotes statistically significant at 5% level, * denotes statistically significant at 10% level.
In the table below we specify data definitions and sources used in the estimated 
models.
The two re-estimated specifications confirm the results of Campos (2001) even 
when the observed period has been extended to the entire transition era of almost 
twenty years28. Barro and Levine-Renelt coefficients are all insignificant. There 
are only a few minor changes in signs that are sometimes in accordance with the 
expected ones (secondary education and government consumption in Barro’s 
model). 
28  There is another interesting result for both specifications: although the explanatory power of 
the models (adjusted R2) is relatively high for the two periods when observed separately, for 
the entire period it becomes weak and almost negligible. This indicates that the two phases of 
transition have been substantially different and gives us a new task for further research.26
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However,  in  the  second  period  1999-2007,  according  to  our  calculations 
presented in Table 7 there is some new evidence. These changes are fewer in Barro 
specifications and our results in estimating that model could be summarised as 
follows:
•	 The	lack	of	statistically	significant	coefficients	is	still	evident;	
•	 The	signs	of	initial	income	per capita and basic education are opposite to what 
we should expect (although primary education remains significant) while the 
CIS dummy became insignificant and has obtained a negative sign; 
•	 Secondary	 education	 does	 have	 an	 expected,	 positive	 sign	 but	 remains	
statistically insignificant; 
•	 Government	 consumption	 has	 an	 expected,	 negative	 sign	 and	 becomes	
significant in comparison with the preceding decade. 
In estimating Levine-Renelt specifications we may note somewhat more expected 
adjustments. Basically, our findings indicate the following:
•	 Initial	income	per	capita	has	an	expected	negative	sign	and	is	statistically	
significant (contrary to the preceding period);
•	 Investments	have	an	expected	sign	and	became	more	significant	in	comparison	
with the preceding decade; 
•	 Secondary	education	remains	statistically	insignificant	but	with	an	expected	
sign;
•	 The	sign	for	the	population	growth	coefficient	remains	opposite	to	what	we	
should expect and is not significant29;
•	 The	CIS	dummy	remains	significant,	but	–	surprisingly	–	with	a	positive	sign	
(meaning that CIS countries experienced larger output increases than the ones 
in Central European economies in the second decade of transition, despite 
their lower assessments for transition progress).
According to the results commented on we may conclude that transition economies 
still remain structurally different from other market economies at comparable 
levels of per capita income after almost two decades of transition efforts. This 
provides new evidence regarding the transition path that every transition economy 
has to travel: it appears much longer than predicted, which is in accordance with 
29  This strange result is probably connected with the general climate of a transition economy: if 
there is some growth and better performance the standard of living is better and population 
growth higher. However, in many transition economies population growth was halted due to 
deterioration of living conditions, and even a high mortality rate has been related to certain 
transition policies like mass privatisation (see: Stuckler et al. 2009) Transition and Growth: What Was Taught and what Happened
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the data presented in our Table 1. On the other hand we may conclude that over 
time and in comparison with the results obtained for non-transition countries, 
the Barro and Levin-Renelt approach in particular starts to perform slightly better 
in later years of the transition process, or perhaps in the years when transition 
economies have managed somehow to adjust to the new economic environment 
and new economic settings (whatever their contents might be). 
6. CONClUSIONS
Re-calculating  the  EBRD  assessments  for  transition  progress  into  percentage 
points we have shown that the transition process is still an ongoing process in a 
vast majority of transition economies and is far from its projected end. This is in 
sharp contrast with predictions and expectations of the duration of transition at 
the beginning of this process.
Moreover, this prolonged course of action is perfectly explicable when transition 
progress is seen as an endogenous variable that depends on initial conditions 
of a transition economy. According to the analysis conducted the hypothesis 
concerning the impact of initial conditions on the transition progress has been 
confirmed. The obtained results show that the influence of a country’s economic 
and institutional heritage lasts much longer than was envisaged at the beginning 
of transition and in the first transition advancement analyses. 
A prolonged transition produces direct effects on growth: if the transition process 
had to be fast the corresponding transition recession and the corresponding U 
shaped GDP growth curve should be short and shallow; since this was not the 
case transition recession including subsequent recovery lasted much longer and 
induced higher costs than expected.
It was shown that in the first years of transition the progress achieved in reforming 
a country’s economic structure could play a certain role regarding that country’s 
performance. This is not necessarily due to the impact of reforms alone, since 
more favourable initial conditions positively affect both reforms and performance 
– the latter one via known factors of growth. Nevertheless, in the longer run 
this effect fades out and currently there is no significant relationship between 
performance and transition progress (even if it could influence growth it would 
make an unfavourable impact since the correlation coefficient between the two 
series has a negative sign).28
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From  a  different  perspective  the  initial  impact  of  the  transition  progress  in 
the first years of transition could be understood as a peculiar and unexpected 
outcome from the standpoint of traditional long-term growth models. Since a 
faster transition progress depends on a higher initial level of development and 
a country’s other favourable initial conditions this will favour better-developed 
countries to attain higher GDP growth rates. 
The  analysis  of  the  two  long-term  growth  models  has  confirmed  the  above 
proposition: it was shown that in the first years of transition one may encounter 
peculiar results. In general, the more developed countries perform better, which 
in turn, obstructs catch-up attempts of the poorer countries. In the second decade 
of transition the models do not exhibit all the peculiarities observed during an 
earlier transition phase but still do not behave in an expected way (although 
results may slightly diverge depending on the model specification observed). 
Nevertheless, this peculiar growth pattern and the corresponding sequence of 
events could explain why a forced, uniform and quick transition – primarily in 
the countries that do not have necessary prerequisites for fast reforms concerning 
their initial conditions – may harm the growth abilities of these countries. Since 
poorer initial conditions do not support fast and radical changes towards the 
model  of  a  developed  market  economy  it  follows  that  some  countries  could 
perform better under less aggressive institutional adjustments and with persistent 
but slower institution building and restructuring. 
This brings us to our final point: reforms were inevitable but their effects, speed 
and sequencing should have been studied more carefully prior to implementation. 
In brief, the reform process under transition would have been more successful if it 
had been adjusted to the initial conditions of each country. Since this was not the 
case we might conclude that many transition economies have faced unnecessarily 
big losses in terms of growth and suffered a substantial delay in the catch-up 
process. 
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